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Melanie B. Leslie

A. The Conflict: Trustee As Beneficiaries' Advo
cate Versus The "Business Imperative"

1.

Melanie B. Leslie

is Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for
Family Law and Bioethics at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Yeshiva University. Her writings
include a leading trusts and estates casebook (co
edited with Joel Dobris and Stewart Sterk), Trusts
and Estates: Concepts and Insights (with Stewart
Sterk), and scholarly articles exploring the limits of
testamentary freedom and the nature and scope of
fiduciary duties. In addition to Trusts and Estates, she
has taught Property and Evidence, both at Cardozo
and at N.Y.U. Law School.
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A complete set of the course materials from which
this outline was drawn may be purchased from ALI
ABA at www.ali-aba.org/aliaba/CK067.htm.

The slow erosion and eventual repeal of the Glass
Steagall Act, which separated commercial and
investment banking institutions, induced increasing
numbers of institutional trust companies to merge,
affiliate with, or purchase financial institutions
offering investment banking services. 12 U.S.C.
§377 (1935), repealed by Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1341 ( 1999). See Joan M. LeGraw & Stacey L.
Davidson, Glass-Steagall and the "Subtle Hazards" ef
Judicial Activism, 24 New Eng. L. Rev. 225, 226-28
(1989). As a result, banks now offer both trustee and
investment services, and increasing numbers of
financial institutions are entering the trust market.
Institutional trustees can maximize profits by
investing trust assets in related companies, earning
both trustee commissions and other fees, such
as those related to the management and sale of
the investment. Trust departments now routinely
earn additional commissions and fees for banks by
investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds
and other investment vehicles managed or sold by
trustee banks.

2. This development directly conflicts with the

trustee's duty of loyalty, which requires the trustee
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to subordinate its interests to the trust's. Until recently, the duty flatly prohibited a trustee from earning
any fees in addition to trustee commission, or in any way profiting from its position as trustee, without
advance authorization from the settlor, trust beneficiaries, or a court. In recent years, banks have
strenuously advocated for relaxation of the duty of loyalty, arguing that change is needed to enable
banks to remain competitive, and more importantly, that trust customers want trustee banks to engage
in self-dealing. That is, trust customers choose particular banks to act as trustees because they offer
not only investment expertise but a variety of sound financial products in which to invest trust assets.
In short, the "business imperative," to use Professor Robert Whitman's term, requires relaxation of
stringent duty of loyalty standards.
3.

Banks' aggressive lobbying efforts recently have resulted in state and uniform statutes that weaken,
and in some instances eviscerate, the protections afforded by centuries-old duty of loyalty rules. These
changes have occurred without sufficient consideration or understanding of trust law's underlying
objectives. If the term "trustee" is to have any distinct meaning, fiduciary standards should ensure that
trustees do not advance their interests at the trust's expense. This article argues that the duty of loyalty
rules should seek to require trustees to make full disclosure in advance of taking action that might be
detrimental to the trusts interests. The traditional duty of loyalty standard accomplishes that objective.
Some newer statutes, however, fully undermine it.

B.

Rules Should Be Designed To Force Full Disclosure In Advance Of Self-Dealing

1.

The Play ing Field Is Not Level At The Time Of Trust Creation
a. When the trust creator ("settlor") negotiates with the institutional trustee, the trustee is in the superior
bargaining position. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trusf,ees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits ef Default Rules,
94 Georgetown L. J. 67 (2005)(exploring how information asymmetries between trustees, settlors,
and beneficiaries justify making some fiduciary duties mandatory). Trustees generate business by
holding themselves out as uniquely qualified both to manage trust assets and zealously protect and
advance beneficiaries' interests. Relying on those implicit or explicit representations, the settlor
brings to the table a set of assumptions about the services she is purchasing. Although the settlor
may not be familiar of the details of the loyalty standard, it is a safe bet that the settlor assumes that
the trustee will subordinate its interests to those of the trusts. On the other hand, the institutional
trustee is a repeat player that understands background law and how to tailor trust terms to its own
advantage. q: Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure ef Corporat,e Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1549,
1566 (1989) (arguing that "uncertainty about operation of the customized term is likely to run
against the prospective shareholder and in favor of the firm" since the firm has greater incentive
than the shareholder to understand how a particular customized charter term will operate).
b. With troubling frequency, trust settlors of modest wealth are entering into trust arrangements without
the advice of independent counsel. This exacerbates the bargaining imbalance between settlor and
trustee. Unfortunately, settlor representation does not always cure the problem. Of course, the vast
majority of attorneys will aggressively represent their clients. Moreover, professional trustees often
obtain business from trust attorneys who recommend trustees to their clients, which may create an
incentive for trustees to behave in accordance with fiduciary standards. John Langbein, Qy,estioning
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the Trust Law Du!)! ef L(!Jal!_y: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 Yale L.J. 929 (2005). But the traditional
model in which a wealthy client selects a family lawyer whose primary motive is to protect the
settlor by choosing a reputable trustee and drafting a trust instrument thoroughly protective of
the beneficiaries' interests has become less prevalent in recent years, as commercial banks and
traditional trust companies lose market share to brokerage firms and other non-traditional trust
providers. See V Gerard Comizio and Jeffrey L. Hare, Regulatory Developments for Banks and Thrifts
Conducting Trust and Fiduciary Activities, 59 Bus. Law. 1299 (May 2004).
c. With increasing frequency, it is the trustee who works with, and has authority over, settlor's attorney.
The client may consult an investment adviser, who recommends a revocable living trust and an
attorney to look over the documents. As Professor Geraldjohnston explains:
It is a widespread practice among corporate fiduciaries to retain the services of the lawyer who drafted a will or trust
in which a bank is named as executor or trustee to perform any legal work that may be necessary in estate or trust ad
ministration. In probating a testator's estate, legal services are virtually always needed because of the strict application
of laws relating to unauthorized practice of law, which preclude corporate fiduciaries from handling matters processed
through the probate court system. The policy of retaining the draftsman to provide legal services has been described as
a "gentlemen's agreement" between financial institutions and the bar, as "reciprocal back scratching," as a "symbiotic
relationship," and, less generously, as a "conspiracy" between corporate executors and lawyers to exploit the client by
recommending that the testator name a bank as executor in exchange for assurance that the executor, once appointed,
will retain the attorney to assist in the probate of the testator's estate.

See, Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Ana{ysis ef Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad
Ethics?, 45 Ohio St. LJ. 57, 115 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
d. Although this arrangement appears to give the attorney power over the trustee (because the trustee
wants to induce the attorney to bring it business), it does not seem beyond the pale to suppose that
some attorneys engaged in this type of symbiotic relationship might agree to trust terms simply to
keep the relationship on an even keel. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agenqy Costs Theory ef Trust Law, 89
Cornell L. Rev. 621, 644---45 (2004) (arguing that "information-forcing default rule [s]" are justified to
remedy informational asymmetries between inexperienced settlors and repeat player trust attorneys);
see, e.g,, Committee on Prq/1JSsional Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, 492 N.W2d 695 (Iowa 1992) (reprimanding
attorney for accepting over 100 referrals from financial services company establishing living trusts
and failing to advise clients in a disinterested fashion).
e. When attorneys are the ones seeking the recommendations, trustees face little pressure to impress
them. See, e.g., Committee on Prqfessional Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, supra. And, as a spate of recent
disciplinary cases demonstrates, some attorneys might be tempted to protect their referral source.
See, e.g,, State v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1995) (publicly censuring attorney for aiding trust marketer
in the unauthorized practice of law by issuing standard form advice letters in response to trust
marketer's clients' requests for legal advice); Committee on Prof Ethics v. Matias, 521 N.W2d 704
(Iowa 1994) (lawyer's license suspended for accepting referrals from company that marketed living
trusts); In re Mid-America Living Trust Associates, Inc., 927 S.W2d 855 (Mo. 1996) (enjoining living
trust company, which sold living trust kits to clients and recommending attorneys to those clients,
from doing business in Missouri); Cincinnati Bar Assoc. v. Kathman, 748 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 2001)
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(suspending attorney from practicing law for aiding trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of
law and failing to render meaningful legal advice to trust marketer's customers).
f. The asymmetrical information problem is exacerbated by a lack of market mechanisms. Leslie,
Trusting Trustees, supra. Compare the trust settlor to the corporate shareholder. Unlike shareholders,
settlors cannot look to share price or information markets to help evaluate the performance of
the fiduciary. Although even uninformed shareholders can free-ride on the efforts of institutional
investors, the settlor with inadequate information is on her own.

2.

Trust Beneficiaries Are Poor Monitors Of Trustee Behavior
a. Because the trust relationship extends well beyond the death of the settlor, the responsibility for
monitoring trustees' behavior falls to the beneficiaries. Trust beneficiaries tend to be uniquely
poor monitors. See generally, Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra (exploring how information asymmetries
between trustees, settlers, and beneficiaries justify making some fiduciary duties mandatory).
Often, the very reason that beneficiaries received an inheritance in trust is because the settlor did
not believe they were capable of managing large sums of money on their own, either because
they are minors or because they lack financial sophistication. Most beneficiaries, therefore, are
ill equipped to understand whether a trustee's actions are in the trust's best interests. Moreover,
because institutional trustees hold themselves out as being trustworthy, beneficiaries are likely to
trust the trustee instead of closely monitoring his or her behavior.
b. Moreover, the market forces that pressure other types of fiduciaries (such as corporate fiduciaries)
to avoid opportunistic behavior are largely absent in the trust context. See Leslie, Trusting Trustees,
supra. There is no public information market that informs beneficiaries that trustees' acts might
be harming the trust. Because most trust management is secret, disclosed only to beneficiaries,
trustees who have failed to internalize the loyalty norm may not worry that self-dealing acts will
be communicated to their customers as a whole. Even if a particular beneficiary discovers that her
trustee is performing poorly, she will be unlikely to communicate this to the trustee's other clients,
of whom she is unaware.
c. Finally, the beneficiary's ability to exit the relationship is severely constrained. Leslie, Trusting
Trustees, supra. Beneficiaries often depend, at least to some degree, on the trust assets. Moreover,
there is no market for beneficiaries' interests, especially if the trust is a spendthrift trust. Replacing
a trustee is difficult and expensive. Beneficiaries' relative inability to exit is relevant for two reasons;
first, trustees who have not internalized the loyalty norm can cause greater damage to beneficiaries.
Unlike other relationships, where participants can end the relationship by breaking it off or selling
their shares, beneficiaries may be stuck with a self-dealing trustee for years. Even if beneficiary is
able to detect the trustee's opportunistic transaction, his only option is to sue the trustee. The value
of the recovery may not justify the expense of litigation.

3.

Default Rules Should Seek To Force Disclosure
a. In sum, in crafting a set of rules to protect settlors and beneficiaries, it makes sense to place the
burden to disclose opportunistic behavior squarely on the trustee. The trustee knows the details
about the self-dealing investments in which it wishes to engage. If, at the time of contracting, the
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trustee contemplates investing in proprietary mutual funds, the burden should be on the trustee to
disclose t hat fact, and to receive the settlor's express permission to do so, subject to qualifications
on which the now-informed settlor demands. If, during the life of the trust, the trustee wishes to
benefit from its position in ways not contemplated in the trust document, the trustee should have
the burden of fully disclosing the details of the proposed transaction to the beneficiaries before
engaging in the behavior.
b. As it turns out, duty of loyalty principles designed to force prior disclosure have been in place for
well over 100 years. Trust law's "no further inquiry" and "advance approval" doctrines compensate
for imbalances in bargaining position and the absence of monitoring capability. See generally, LeslieJ
In Defense, supra. Recent statutory enactments, most notably the Uniform Trust Code, gut those
long-standing rules in favor of a more lenient approach. In doing so, they place trust settlors and
beneficiaries at a serious disadvantage.
C.

Established Duty Of Loyalty Principles Best Force Disclosure

1.

The No Further Inquiry Rule
a. For centuries, trust law has stubbornly insisted that when the trustee profits from engaging in a
conflicted transaction with the trust, the beneficiary may void the transaction unless the trustee
obtained prior approval. See Restatement (Third) ef Trusts §78 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 6, May
23, 2003) (stating that the "duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison
to the standards of other fiduciary relationships"). The trustee is held per se liable simply upon the
beneficiary's showing that the trustee had a personal interest in the transaction (the "no further
inquiry" rule), even if the self-interested transaction caused the trust no damage. See Restatement
(Third) ef Trusts §78 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 6, May 23, 2003) (stating that under the no
further inquiry rule "it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the action in question
was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no profit resulted to
the trustee"). The trustee must disgorge all profits realized as a result of the transaction and return
them to the trust.
b. Consider an example: X is trustee of a testamentary trust that holds as an asset a 20-acre plot of
land. X determines that the time is right to sell the land for development. In addition to being trustee,
X also happens to be a developer, and she would like to purchase the land from the trust hersel(
After obtaining several appraisals, X purchases the land from the trust for a sum that she reasonably
believes represents the land's fair market value. If the trust's beneficiaries sue the trustee for breach
of the duty of loyalty, should they prevail even though the trustee seemed to have paid a fair price?
The law answers "yes." See, e.g,, Staats v. Bergen, 17 NJ. Eq. 554, 559 (Err. & App. 1867) (finding trustee
liable for breach of the duty of loyalty for purchasing trust property at a foreclosure sale because "the
interest of the [trustee] was directly antag<;>nistic to the that of the complainant. A low price was the
gain of the defendant, but it was, in the same ratio, a loss to the complainant"); Marshall v. Carson, 38
NJ. Eq. 250 (Err. & App. 1884) (finding that trustee who purchased land from the trust breached duty
of loyalty because "there is an inherent conflict of interest in the idea that a purchaser wants to pay
the lowest possible price for land, while a trustee wants to sell the land for the best possible price.")
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If X had sold the land on the open market, she would have used her best efforts to obtain
the highest possible price for the land, which might have resulted in a higher sale price. If so,
the beneficiaries were harmed by the trustee's purchase of the trust assets, even if the trustee
paid a price within the range of the property's fair market value, because the trustee did not,
and could not expect to, advocate for the trust beneficiaries seeking to obtain the highest price.
See Restatement (Third) ef Trusts §78 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 6, May 23, 2003) (stating that
"[a] trustee commits a breach of trust by purchasing trust property, even as the highest bidder
at a public auction"; the Restatement (Second) ef Trusts §170 suggests that a trustee should obtain
court approval for the purchase of trust property, and that a court should grant that approval only
when the purchase is in the beneficiary's best interests.) Instead, the trustee, not the trust, captured
some of the value generated by the deal. Moreover, beneficiaries and a court would have difficulty
determining after the fact whether X in fact paid top dollar for the property; the market is a better
indicator of fair market value than is an ex post judgment by the court. As Robert Cooter and
Bradley Friedman have put it, "To overcome difficulties in proof, the law infers disloyalty from its
appearance, presuming that a fiduciary will appropriate the principal's asset when it is in her self
interest to do so." See Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Friedman, The Fiduciary Re/,ationship: Its Economic
Characf,er and Legal Consequences, 66 N.YU. Law Rev. 1045, 1055 (1991).
1.

c. The no further inquiry rule supports trust settlors' objectives. The trustee earns compensation for acting
as the beneficiaries' advocate. The trustee's duty is to subordinate its own interest to the beneficiaries'
interests. The trustee's role is to advocate zealously for trust beneficiaries at all times, without regard
for the trustee's personal interests. The trustee's promise to subordinate its interests to those of the
beneficiaries reassures the settlor that her loved ones will be well cared for after her death.
d. The no further inquiry rule also corrects for the lack of external pressures on the trustee. See
Leslie, In Defense, supra. The rule's bright-line prohibition on self dealing without advance approval,
and the unusually harsh remedy it provides (disgorgement of all profits, even if the trust was not
harmed) create appropriate disincentives to self dealing. See Robert H. Sitkofi; Trust Law, Corporate
Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28]. Corp. L. 565, 573 (2003); Restatement (Third) ef Trusts §78 cmt.
b (Preliminary Draft No. 6, May 23, 2003) (recognizing that beneficiaries' attempts to monitor
trustee performance are likely to be "inefficient if not ineffective" because monitoring efforts will be
"wastefully expensive," and suffer from a lack of information, resources, and necessary knowledge
and experience). Were there a thick, functioning market for beneficial interests in trusts, the rule
would not be necessary. Because there is no such market, the rule operates as a substitute.
e. The rule sends a clear message to trustees: absent unusual circumstances, you may not profit from
your position (aside from trustee commissions). If you want to transact business with the trust, you
must obtain advance authorization from a court or the trust beneficiaries.

2.

The Advance Approval Requirement
a. There is one important exception to the complete prohibition on self-dealing: the advance approval
doctrine. If a trustee genuinely believes that an opportunistic transaction is also the best option
for the trust, the trustee may obtain authorization from the settlor (in the trust document), the
beneficiaries (after the trust is up and running), or a court. See Leslie, In Defense, supra.
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b. Settlor-authorized conflicts are allowed because they reflect settlor's determination that allowing the
conflicted transaction will maximize the trust's value and effectuate settlor's intent. In authorizing
the transaction, the settlor relieves the beneficiary from the need to monitor the trustee's behavior
with respect to that transaction. Thus, the no further inquiry rule's effect to compensate for lack of
monitoring is not implicated when settlors authorize specific conflicted transactions. By dictating
that trustees must obtain advance approval for arry transaction from which the trustee stands to profit
personally, the rule corrects for beneficiaries' inability to assess whether the trustee is conflicted
with respect to any particular transaction. By requiring the trustee to explain to a court or to the
beneficiary why the transaction is in the trust's best interests, it relieves the beneficiary of the need
to have the same knowledge and expertise as the trustee. By allowing the beneficiary to state a
claim upon a simple showing that trustee sat on both sides of a transaction, it places the burden
of production on the trustee. And because disclosure does generate some cost, the rule ensures
that the trustee will not habitually or regularly self deal, but will do so only when a conflicted
transaction really is in the trust's best interests. See Leslie, In Defense, supra.
c. Trustees may also obtain authorization for self-dealing acts from the beneficiary. Historically, courts
have scrutinized trustee claims of beneficiary authorization quite closely, rejecting such authorization
as a defense to trustee self dealing if trustee cannot prove that the consenting beneficiaries were
fully informed of the details of the problematic transactions.
d. Finally, trustees may appeal to a court for advance approval. In some number of cases, the judicial
process is unlikely to amount to a full-blown trial and appeal, and is not likely to be expensive.
Of course, when judicial proceedings do take on the characteristics of a full-blown trial, the costs
of approval may outweigh the benefits of the transaction to the trust. In those cases, it is hard
to believe that the cost of a missed opportunity constitutes serious harm to the trust. The more
opposition the proposal raises, the less likely the beneficiaries will be harmed if the opportunity is
missed. See Leslie, In Defense, supra.

3.

Because Established Dury Of Loyal!) Rules Did Not Prohibit Proprietary Investing, Recent Relaxation Of The Standard
Benefits Only Institutional Trustees.
a. The no further inquiry rule best ensures that settlors and beneficiaries understand what the trustee
is doing, alerts them to the need to monitor behavior, and, by putting burden on the trustee to make
the case for the conflicted transaction, best facilitates monitoring.
b. The common law duty of loyalty both protected settlors and beneficiaries, and allowed them to
authorize conflicted transactions when it was in the trust's best interest to do so. It is hard to believe,
therefore, that the change in loyalty rules is a response to client demand. The only explanation for
new statutes gutting the no further inquiry rule is that institutional trustees demanded the changes
to make life easier and more profitable. See Leslie, In Defense, supra.

D. The Uniform Trust Code And The New Loyalty Rules: Bad For Trust Settlors And
Beneficiaries

I.

Proprietary Mutual Funds
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a. Until quite recently, a trustee's unauthorized purchase of investments from which the trustee or an
affiliated company would earn a commission was considered unequivocally to be a clear breach of
the duty of loyalty justifying the application of the no further inqui ry rule. As both the First and
Second Restatements ef Trusts have put it:
I. Sale to trust by corporate trustee. A corporate trustee violates its duty to the beneficiary if it purchases property
for the trust from one of its departments, as where it purchases for the trust securities owned by it in its securities or
banking department. A corporate trustee cannot proper!) purclzasefar the trust property owned by an effiliated or subsidiary cOJporation in
which it has the entire interest or a controlling interest or an interest ef such a substantial nature that there would be a temptation to consider
its own advantage in making the sale and not to consider sole!) the advantage to the benefi,ciaries ef the trust. The rule is the same where
the shares of the selling corporation are owned by the shareholders of the corporate trustee.

See Restatement (Second) ef Ti-usts, § 170, cmt. I (emphasis added). The Restatement (Second) offers the
following examples of prohibited transactions:
Illustrations:
1. A is trustee for B. A is also a bond dealer. A purchases certain bonds and sells them to himself as trustee. A commits
a breach of trust in so doing.
2. A is trustee for B. A is a member of a firm of bond dealers. A purchases for the trust certain bonds owned by the
firm. He commits a breach of trust in so doing.

Throughout the twentieth century, institutional trustees vigorously argued for a change in the
Restatement position. Courts and scholars, however, stuck to their guns. In a Harvard Law Review
article, Professor Scott confronted the issue:
It is sometimes contended that a trust company should be permitted to purchase securities for its trusts fiom its secwities or banlcing
department, because it is in a j1osition tojudge most wise!) as to the value ef such securities. ff it always acted with an unbiasedjudgment,
this might conceivabl) be so. But the difficulty is that it is not in a position to exercise an unbiasedjudgment. In a sense the difficulties are
greater than those ... of an individual trustee. An honorable individual trustee can hardly help seeing the direct conflict
between its own interests and its duty to the beneficiaries. On the other hand, the qfficers ef a trust company owe allegiance
to !he shareholdm as well as to the benefi,ciaries, and the temptation toJavor the shareholders may well be more insidious than the temptation
e the individual trustee toJavor himself. It seems clear that in both cases self-dealing is too dangerous to be permitted ... .The
f

same principle is applicable where a corporate trustee purchases property from an affiliated or subsidiary corporation
in which it has the entire interest or a controlling interest or an interest of such a substantial nature that there would be
a temptation to consider its own advantage in making the sale and not to consider solely the advantage to beneficiaries
of the trust.

Austin Wakeman Scott, The Trustee's Duty ef Loyalty, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 521, 543-544 ( 1936) (emphasis
added).

b. State Statutes
In the last 20 years, state legislatures have enacted statutes that authorize institutional trustees
to invest trust assets in mutual fund accounts that they manage. These statutes enable institutional
trustees to earn additional fees, and create an incentive for trustees to invest in assets that earn them
1.

an additional commission.
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(1) The following statutes authorize trustees to invest in mutual funds or other investments
from which they will earn additional commissions or fees: Alaska Stat. §13.90.010 (2004); Ark.
Code Ann. §28-71-104 (2004); Cal. Prob. Code §16015 (West 2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-109902 (2004); Ga. Code Ann. §53-8-2 (2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. §412:8-400 (2004); Idaho Code
Ann. §68-404A (2004); 760 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5.2 (2004); Ind. Code §28-1-12-3 (2004); Iowa
Code Ann. §633. l 23A (West Supp. 2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §386.020 (West 2004); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §9:2127 (2005); Md. Code Ann. Fin. Inst. §3-512 (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §487.14405 (West Supp. 2004); Mo. Ann. Stat. §362.550 (West Supp. 2005); N.D. Cent.
Code §6-05-15 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. §709.175 (2004); S.C. Code Ann. §62-7-302 (2004);
Tenn. Code Ann. §35-3-117 (Supp. 2004); Utah Code Ann. §75-7-802 (Supp. 2004); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann.§11.100.035 (West 2005); W Va. Code Ann. §44-6-9 (West 2004).
11. Many of these statutes exacerbate asymmetrical information problems. By failing to contract
around the statute, most settlors would be agreeing to an exception to the long-established
prohibition on self-dealing without even knowing it. Moreover, because beneficiaries will be poor
judges of whether the investment chosen by the trustee is an inferior option, trustees would have
little incentive to invest in any products other than those in which the institution has an additional
interest. Finally, these statutes erode the normative proscription against self-dealing that is the basis
of trust law.
iii. With a nod to the information and monitoring problems that authorization of proprietary
mutual funds creates, some state statutes require a trustee who earns such commissions and fees to
expressly disclose that fact to the trust beneficiaries.
(1) Ala. Code §19-3-120.1 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §6-246 (2004); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§45a-209 (West 2005); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §3312 (Supp. 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann. §660.417
(West 2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, §7-408 (2004); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 167G,
§3 (West Supp. 2005); Minn. Stat. Ann. §501B.151 (West 2005); Miss. Code Ann. §81-5-33
(2004); Mont. Code Ann. §32-1-420 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. §30-3205 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§662.097, 669.225 (West 2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-2A- l (West 2004); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1111.13 (West Supp. 2004); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §7314.1 (West Supp. 2004);
S.D. Codified Laws §55-lA-9 (2004); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §113.053 (Vernon 2005); Va.
Code Ann. §26-44.1 (2004); Wis. Stat. Ann. §881.015 (West 2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §2-3-301
(2003).
1v. T he Nebraska statute goes farther, requiring trustees to obtain beneficiaries' consent to double
dipping in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §30-3205 (1995). And a smaller number of states go farther to
protect beneficiaries: these state statutes authorize trustees to invest in their own funds but force
trustees to choose between earning trustee commissions or mutual fund administrator fees. N.Y
Est. Powers & Trusts Law §11-2.2 (Consol. 1990 & Supp. 2005); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, §175.55
(West 2005).
c. UTC Section 802(/)

The Uniform Trust Code validates the trend with no critical analysis, and takes an extreme
approach in failing to adopt the protections for beneficiaries that some states have. Section 802(fj

1.
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simply states that trustees who purchase investments from related companies are not presumed to
have violated the duty of loyalty, and that the trustee may earn additional fees or commissions,
payable by the trust, in so doing. The comments suggest that this self-interested investing is no
longer subject to the no further inquire rule. Although the comments warn that "the trustee, in
deciding whether to invest in a mutual fund, must not place its own interests ahead of those of the
beneficiaries" it is difficult to know what this means. If the trustee chooses a mutual fund in part to
gain a financial advantage, who will be the wiser? If the very point of the no further inquiry rule
is to provide a substitute for inadequate monitoring, then it makes no sense to say that the duty
of loyalty still applies to this type of investing. Although the statute requires the trustee to issue
annually a report that includes "the rate and method by which compensation was determined"
(UTC §802(D), many beneficiaries will be unable to understand whether trustee's proprietary funds
are the best choice. Institutional trustees will have free reign to engage in self-interested investing.
Leslie, In Defense, supra.
( l) In a recent draft of the Restatement (Third), the drafters take note of this state statutory
development, and characterize it as an "exception" to the duty of loyalty. They do not appear
to endorse these statutes however. See Restatement (Third) ef Trusts § 7 8 cmt. c(8) (Preliminary
Draft No. 6, May 23, 2003) (noting that the UTC comments purporting to justify the exception
merely describe the advantages of mutual funds, but do not explain why investments in
proprietary mutual funds are necessary) and comment c (describing the proprietary mutual fund
exception as "an exception that has been adopted by (and is dependent upon) legislation enacted
in most American jurisdictions")(emphasis supplied).

2. Elimination Of The Nofurther Inquiry Rule With Respect To Other 'fypes Of Proprietary Investing By Institutional
Trustees: Section 802(c)(4)

a. The UTC does an about-face with respect to traditional loyalty doctrine in its treatment of trustees
who transact trust business with related individuals. Transactions between the trustee and the trustee's
spouse, close relatives, agents, attorneys or entities in which the trustee (or a person that owns a
significant interest in the trustee) has an interest are no longer subject to the no further inqui ry rule.
See UTC §802(c)(4). As the comments make clear, such transactions give rise only to a presumption
of breach, which the trustee can rebut by establishing that the transaction was not affected by the
conflict of interest. The comments suggest that trustee can meet its burden by establishing that the
consideration was fair or close to market value, which replaces the no further inquiry rule with the
corporate fairness standard. Oddly, the comments to section 802(c)(4) suggest that the section as a
whole is comparable to the federal regulation governing federally chartered banks. (The last sentence
of the comment reads "For a comparable provision regulating fiduciary investments by national
banks, see 12 C.FR. §9. l 2(a).") Yet the regulation to which the comment refers in fact flatly prohibits
(unless otherwise authorized by state law) most types of conflicted transactions between fiduciaries
and companies related to them. The regulation to which the Comments refer, 12 C.F.R. §9.12(a),
reads as follows:
§9.12 Self-dealing and conflicts of interest.
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ent for fiduciary accounts - (1) In general. Unless authorized by applicable law, a national bank may not
(a) Investm s
duciary account for which a national bank has investment discretion in the stock or obligations of,
invest
1r.unds of a fi
.
from: the bank or any of its directors, officers, or employees; affiliates of the bank or any of their
or in assets acquired
directors, officers, or employees; or individuals or organizations with whom there exists an interest that might affect the
exercise of the best judgment of the bank.
(2) Additional securities investments. If retention of stock or obligations of the bank or its affiliates in a fiduciary
account is consistent with applicable law, the bank may:
(i) Exercise rights to purchase additional stock (or securities convertible into additional stock) when offered pro rata to
stockholders; and
(ii) Purchase fractional shares to complement fractional shares acquired through the exercise of rights or the receipt of
a stock dividend resulting in fractional share holdings.

b. UTC §802(c)(4) is another significant departure from well-established doctrine. As Bogert notes,
historically the law has not distinguished between when the trustee acts to benefit itself, and when
the trustee acts to benefit some third party. ("Indirect disloyalty is just as objectionable as direct."
George T. Bogert, Trusts §95, at 344 (West, 6th ed. 1987).) Both are violations of the duty of loyalty
and subject to the no further inquiry rule.
Bogert's treatise gives as a specific example of indirect self-dealing a case where a trustee sells
trust property to X, to enable X to resell the property for a profit; here, even if the sale is "otherwise
unexceptional" and trustee derives no direct profit, the beneficiary can void the transaction. Bogert,
supra note , at 342-343. Further, Bogert emphasizes, "whether the trustee acted in good faith and
with honest intentions is not relevant, nor is it important that the transaction attacked was fair and
for adequate consideration so that the beneficiary has suffered no loss as a result of the disloyal
act." Bogert, supra note, at 343. Bogert further explains that the harshness of the rule is necessary
to send a clear message to trustees to avoid temptation. Bogert, supra note, at 343.
1.

A recent draft of the Restatement (Third) continues the prohibition on indirect self-dealing,
and reaffirms that the no further inqui ry rule applies to such transactions. See Restatement (Third) ef
Trusts §78 cmt. e (Preliminary Draft No. 6, May 23, 2003), which provides that:

11.

[T]he duty of loyalty prohibits the trustee from engaging in transactions, as trustee, with persons with whom the trustee
is closely related or associated. The prohibition also applies to transactions by a trustee, acting in either a fiduciary or
personal capacity, with third persons if the transaction would create a reasonably foreseeable risk of future conflict
between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests. Although not involving self-dealing in the literal or narrowly
financial sense, ... these are transactions that could, if allowed, expose trustees to the temptation of considering interests
other than those of the trust beneficiaries.
Loyalty-based prohibitions therefore apply to transactions ... between the trustee, as trustee, and family members for
whom the trustee could be expected to have a natural, personal concern. For this purpose, the reference to "family
members" includes the trustee's spouse and parents, the trustee's descendants and their spouses, and other individuals
who are the natural objects of the trustee's bounty.

m. Even though courts are sometimes more lenient when a non-professional trustee transacts
with family members, no court has suggested that this leniency should apply when an institutional
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trustee transacts with related institutions. See Melanie B. Leslie, Common La� Common Sense: Fiduciary
Standards and Trustee Identity, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2713 (2006). The UTC's attempt to repudiate well
settled case law truly is troubling.
c. Section 802(c)(4) increases monitoring costs for beneficiaries. Leslie, In Defense, supra. Even the
beneficiary who attempts to monitor the trustee's performance to detect self-interested transacting
will face significant obstacles. To detect self-dealing, a beneficiary must know the extent of the
institutional trustee's other corporate holdings. What is the name of trustee's parent company and
that parent company's subsidiaries? In what companies might the trustee be personally invested? To
determine whether the self-dealing transaction is really in the trust's best interests, the beneficiary
must engage in a comparative analysis of other investment options-has the investment trustee
chosen a superior alternative to all of the other market options? If the trustee transacts business
with the trust, the beneficiary must determine whether the price the trustee received represents fair
market value, or the profit the trustee made was no more than beneficiary would have had to pay
a disinterested third party. In short, to monitor trustee behavior adequately, the beneficiary would
have to have the same knowledge of the market, financial sophistication, and information that the
trustee has. This would defeat the very purpose of a trust that outlives the settlor, which is to relieve
the beneficiary of the responsibility for asset management. A regime that expects the beneficiary to
monitor the trustee is a regime in which the beneficiary is performing the trustee's job.

3.

Implications For Attornf!Ys Who Represent Sett/ors And Beneficiaries
a. The Uniform Trust Code's erosion of the no further inqui ry rule and the advance approval
doctrine has serious implications for those attorneys who represent settlors and trust beneficiaries.
Those who negotiate trust documents can no longer rely on default rules that protect the trust's
interests. Because the UTC's default rules benefit institutional trustees, lawyers must raise the issue
of trustee self-dealing and take proactive steps to protect trust settlors against its negative effects.
The trust document should stipulate whether and to what extent the trustee will be permitted
to earn profits in addition to trustee commissions, and should require the trustee to make full
disclosure of investment activities to beneficiaries.
b. The UTC also creates difficulties for attorneys who represent beneficiaries' interests. Because the
UTC removes the strict liability rule and allows the trustee a "best interest" defense, breach of
duty will be more difficult to prove and litigation will become more expensive. When trustees
invest in proprietary mutual funds, proving breach will be extraordinarily difficult: the UTC shields
the trustee from liability if the mutual fund is a prudent investment, even if it is not the superior
investment.

